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Horizontal intergovernmental forums that bring together the constituent units of a 
federation are increasingly common. This article examines the origin, organization and 
purpose of the premium horizontal intergovernmental forums in Kenya, Spain and Canada. 
The constitutional origin of institutions of horizontal intergovernmental relations is 
uncommon. The experience of the three political forums confirm the view that 
institutionalization of intergovernmental relations may not be a necessary condition for 
effective intergovernmental relations. Yet, in countries with no history of multilevel 
governance or a culture of cross-boundary interaction, institutionalization might give 
horizontal intergovernmental relation the prompt it needs. Despite the expectation that 
they will focus on facilitating horizontal collaboration, however, the forums are focused on 
creating a common front against the national government. They may be horizontal in their 
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Horizontal intergovernmental forums that bring together the constituent units of a 
federation are increasingly common. They are distinguished from vertical forums in their 
exclusion of national governments. They, however, come in different forms. They could be 
summit forums that bring together the leaders of subnational units. They could be sectoral 
structures that bring together persons responsible for the relevant sector in their respective 
subnational governments. They could be forums that involve all subnational units or 
structures that involve only some of the subnational units, often based on regional, 
linguistic or other bonds. In some occasions, they are bilateral. Mostly, however, they are 
multilateral. 
This article examines the origin, organization and purpose of horizontal 
intergovernmental forums in three federal jurisdictions across three continents: Kenya, 
Spain and Canada. In order to do so, it focuses on summit forums (also known as political 
forums) that bring together the leaders of the different subnational governments. The 
focus is thus on the Council of Federations [COF], the Council of County Governors 
[CCG] and the Conference of Autonomous-Community Governments [CAG], the 
premium horizontal intergovernmental forums in Canada, Kenya and Spain respectively. 
The countries are not selected because they provide a representative sample of horizontal 
intergovernmental forums. They are chosen in order to examine the different experiences 
of intergovernmental forums in three different jurisdictions.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The article commences the discussion by 
tracing the origin of the three intergovernmental structures, focusing on the constitutional 
framework within which intergovernmental relations operate in the three federations. The 
article then discusses the organization of the three horizontal intergovernmental structures. 
That is followed by a discussion that examines the purposes of the structures. The article 




Horizontal intergovernmental relations have a long history in Canada. The first meeting 
of Canada’s premiers dates to 1887 when Premier Honore Mercier of Quebec convened 
what is then known as the interprovincial conference (Meekinson 2002). Presided by 
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Premier Oliver Mowat of Ontario, the conference brought together five (of the seven) 
provinces. It did not, however, immediately develop into a regular event. In fact, between 
1887, when the first conference took place, and 1926, after which the inter-provincial 
conference went dormant, only six conferences were held. The interaction between 
provincial governments became more regular when the inter-provincial conference was 
rebranded and re introduced as Annual Premiers’ Conference (APC) in 1960, again upon 
the initiation of the premier of Quebec. The ten premiers continued to meet every year and 
the Conference developed into an important arena of inter-provincial collaboration though 
not so immediately. By the time the leaders of the three territories (i.e. Northwest 
territories, Nunavut and Yukon) joined as equal members of the conference in 1990s, after 
initially attending the conference as observers, the APC have already become an important 
arena not only for collaborating on inter-provincial issues but also for forming a common 
position in negotiations with the federal government. It was only after 40 years of regular 
meetings that a decision was made, again based on a proposal made by the Government of 
Quebec, to create the COF in 2003.I Although the idea originally proposed by Quebec 
envisaged the establishment of an intergovernmental council that brings together the 
federal government and the provinces,II the premiers decided to limit the COF to a forum 
for horizonal collaboration. That makes the COF a slightly institutionalized version of the 
APC. 
By the time the COF was celebrating its fifth-year anniversary, the seeds of horizonal 
intergovernmental structures were just being planted in Spain (Segui 2013).III In 2008, a 
number of Autonomous Communities amended their statutes of autonomy. That same 
year, in a meeting held in Zaragossa, those same Autonomous Communities, upon the 
initiative of the Government of Aragon, agreed to establish a forum through which they 
can harmonize the implementation of their new statutes. That gave birth to the Meetings 
between Autonomous Communities for the Development of the Statutes of Autonomy, a 
forum that was aimed at ‘pool[ing] together the issues that affect or interest them, to 
exchange information, and to set up lines of action that can lead to the signature of 
cooperation agreements or the creation of collaborative tools for a better performance of 
their powers in the interest of citizens’ (Segui 2013: 242). The forum met quiet frequently 
and regularly. Between 2008 and 2010, it met eight times and was able to adopt six 
statements and managed to conclude eleven agreements or protocols (Gálvez and and Ruiz 
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2013).IV The Autonomous Communities were able to form a common position visa a vis 
the national government on a number of issues, including the division of powers, the role 
of the autonomous Communities with respect to decisions made by the State with regard 
to EU, the Senate and state subsidies. They have also developed ‘an early warning system’ 
that is used ‘to detect if there is draft legislation by the central government that might 
encroach upon AC competences’ (Morales 2013: 100). The forum has also facilitated 
horizonal collaboration in the delivery of services through the conclusion of agreements 
and protocols in several sectoral areas (Gálvez and Ruiz 2013). Perhaps it is the relative 
success of the forum that encouraged the establishment of a broader and more regulated 
horizontal intergovernmental institution. But it was only after seven meetings that, in 2010, 
the original members of the forum were joined by the other autonomous communities and 
a decision was made to establish CAG (León & Pereira 2011). Its first meeting was held in 
March 2011.  
As an institution whose establishment was only envisaged in a constitution that is only 
adopted in 2010 and a country that does not have a recent history of federalism, the 
horizontal forum in Kenya has, in contrast, a very short history. Article 40 of the 
Constitution envisages an act of parliament that establishes intergovernmental forums 
(Kenya Constitution 2010). This was realized when the parliament adopted the 
Intergovernmental Relations Act No. 2 of 2012 (hereafter IGR Act), which ‘establishes a 
framework for consultation and co-operation between the National and County 
governments and [most importantly for our purpose] amongst county governments’. 
Article 19 of the IGR Act declares the establishment of the CCG, which shall consist of 
the governors of the forty-seven counties. 
From the foregoing, with the exception of Kenya, it is clear that the origins of the 
horizontal forums were evolutionary and incremental. In the case of Canada, the 
introduction of the COF was preceded by hundred years of informal but well structured 
horizontal interactions. It evolved from the early days of being a social gathering to a 
forum where social interactions have become a side show and more serious issues have 
taken centre stage. Spain does not have a history of hundred years of intergovernmental 
forum. Nevertheless, what is also notable in the case of Spain is also the incremental way in 
which the Meetings of the Autonomous Communities (with few members) evolved into a 
relatively formal horizontal intergovernmental forum that brings together all Autonomous 
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Communities. As Gálvez and Ruiz (2013: 234) note, the establishment of CAG was 
preceded by the ‘progressive increase’ in the number of Autonomous communities that 
attend the Meetings and ‘in the number and importance of the agreements and Protocols 
signed and the issues dealt with in the meetings’. The outlier here is Kenya, where 
intergovernmental relations has no roots. This should not be surprising given its history 
and tradition of unitary centralized government. A form of government that makes 
intergovernmental relation imperative was only introduced recently.  
The contrasting history of the origin of horizontal intergovernmental forums in the 
three case studies raises the question whether a history of intergovernmental structures 
matters for the effective functioning and success of a horizontal forum. There is no doubt 
that a rich history of IGR and intergovernmental forums provides a country with a wealth 
of knowledge and experience in putting in place an effective intergovernmental forum. At 
least, in those cases, there won’t be ambiguities about the institutions and processes of IGR 
that must be employed in order to ensure a forum that meets regularly and frequently. 
Experience might also allow such forums to be less ambitious and adopt decisions that are 
sensitive to the autonomy of subnational units. Perhaps, it is fair to suppose that the 
continued existence and relevance of some form of horizontal forum in Canada owes to its 
long history of horizonal interactions. 
 
3. The Organization 
 
Some intergovernmental structures are more formal and institutionalized than others. 
There are several structural features that determines the formalization and 
institutionalization of an intergovernmental forum (Simmons 2004; Bórzel 2000; Bolleyer 
2006). This first depends on whether the intergovernmental relation is ad hoc or based in 
law. And if it is not ad hoc, the question is whether it is based on a constitutional or extra-
constitutional rule. Another indicator is whether the forum has a clear mandate and rules of 
procedures, which includes pre-determined periodic meeting and rules on how its chair is 
determined. It also depends on whether the structure benefits from support mechanisms in 
a form of a technical wing and interlinked subcommittees that have clear mandates. An 
institutionalized intergovernmental forum would also have a support mechanism in a form 
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of a secretariat that is limited to providing administrative assistance or goes beyond that 
and advises the political forum on policy options. Equally important is also that the forum 
is convened regularly. 
The organization of intergovernmental institutions takes different forms in the three 
countries. The horizontal forum in Kenya represents the most formal and institutionalized 
intergovernmental institution. This largely has to do with the fact that the Kenyan 
Constitution stands in sharp contrast to the Spanish and Canadian constitutions in its 
explicit embrace of intergovernmental cooperation. Although the Constitution expects 
each level of government to exercise its powers in a manner that respects the autonomy 
and distinctiveness of other governments, it also expects the two levels of government to 
‘assist, support and consult’ with each other (Article 189 (1) (b), Kenya Constitution). It 
also expects them to liaise with each other ‘for the purpose of exchange information, 
coordinating policies and administration and enhancing capacity’ (Article 189 (1) (c), Kenya 
Constitution). It expects these to be achieved through forums and mechanisms that 
facilitate cooperation between the different levels of governments. More importantly for 
our purpose, the Constitution does not only envisage vertical interaction between the 
national government and the 47 county governments. It also obliges county governments 
to ‘co-operate in the performance of functions and exercise of powers’ (Art.189 (2), Kenya 
Constitution). The emphasis on cooperative government is also evident in the fact that the 
Constitution mandates the different levels of government to resolve disputes without 
resorting to courts through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration (Art.189(3), Kenya Constitution). In short, the 
Constitution, drawing from its South African counterpart, declares cooperative 
government as an important principle of intergovernmental relations in the devolved 
system of the Kenyan State (Simiyu 2015). 
The establishment of intergovernmental structures, as mentioned earlier, was 
sanctioned by the Constitution that envisaged the establishment of an Act of Parliament 
that provides for intergovernmental structures. The envisaged Act of Parliament, the IGR 
Act, was adopted in 2012. As a result, the constitutive document of the CCG is an Act of 
Parliament, which requires it to meet at least twice a year (Art.21, IGR Act). If requested by 
one third of the members of the council, the Chairperson is obliged to convene a special 
meeting. The Council elects both its chairperson and vice-chairperson (Art.21, IGR Act). 
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Both can serve for a term of one year, but they are eligible for re-election for one further 
term of one year. The IGR Act does not provide for the establishment of a secretariat that 
can provide bureaucratic support specifically to the Council. Rather, it mandates the 
Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee, a shared secretariat that is also 
responsible for providing technical support to the Summit, to facilitate and implement the 
activities of the CCG (Art. 12, IGR Act). In practice, however, the CCG has opted to 
establish its own secretariat that is funded by determined contributions from the counties 
and plans to have it recognized by law (Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee, 
2018). In addition, the CCG has established 18 technical committees.  
Unlike its Kenyan counterpart, the Spanish Constitution does not sanction cooperation 
between the national government and the Autonomous Communities (ACs) (Aja and 
Colino 2014). In fact, the Constitution makes no reference to intergovernmental relations 
or cooperation. The only closest reference that the Constitution makes to 
intergovernmental relations is when it regulates the conclusion of agreements between 
autonomous communities. Even then, it does not provide for a framework that encourages 
agreements between ACs. It actually makes it difficult for ACs to conclude horizontal 
agreements (Morales and Marin 2015).V The Constitutional Court of Spain has, however, 
declared that cooperation is an integral part of the form of government that the country 
has adopted. According to the Court, the principle of cooperation is implicit in the 
territorial design of the state that the Constitution has put in place (STC 18/1982; STC 
11/1986). Although the Court made the comment in a context of vertical relationship 
between the central government and the AC, the principle is arguably applicable to 
horizontal relationships. 
The absence of a constitutional framework for intergovernmental relations in Spain 
means that the CAR, unlike its Kenyan counterpart, is not based on a constitution or any 
other law. Its existence and continued relevance is not legally guaranteed. Although not 
institutionalized, it is not completely ad hoc. It was established based on an agreement 
signed by the ACs. The Conference has ‘operating rules’, which outline the purpose of the 
conference, its composition as well as the frequency and convening of the meeting (Segui 
2013). According to the rules, the highest decision-making body of the conference is the 
plenary session, which is expected to meet twice a year and is chaired on rotational basis. 
Often, the chair of the plenary session, whose term lasts until the next meeting is held, 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
108 
effectively making the term of a chair six months, is a representative of the autonomous 
community that hosts the meeting. The Chairperson, if requested by at least nine members, 
is required to convene a special meeting. The CAR is supported by a Technical 
Commission and a permanent secretariat. Composed of at least Director Generals from the 
autonomous communities, the Technical Commission is responsible for ‘preparing the 
meetings of the conference’. The Permanent Secretary is ‘in charge of the tracking of 
communications, the preparation and the custody of the documents of the conference’ 
(Segui 2013: 243). In addition to the Permanent secretary, each meeting of the conference 
has also a secretariat, which is ‘held by the Community holding the presidency’. It is 
responsible for convening the conference and, when necessary, organizing preparatory 
meeting.  
Although intergovernmental relations, including its horizontal variant, as discussed 
earlier, have a long history in Canada that goes back to the 19th century, it has no explicit 
basis in the constitution. The Constitution of Canada does not include anything that 
resembles the principles of cooperation between the different levels of governments. In 
fact, the division of power that characterizes the canadian federation, famously known as 
‘watertight compartments’,VI many believed, does not leave much room for 
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination for it to receive a constitutional 
recognition. That might also explain why the Constitution of Canada is silent on 
intergovernmental mechanisms despite the numerous and diverse intergovernmental 
forums that exist in the country. Like in Spain, however, Canadian courts have noted the 
evolving nature of Canadian Federalism that is increasingly encouraging cooperation 
between the different levels of governments. As the Supreme Court of Canada has itself 
indicated, in the Securities Reference of 2011, the Court has, since 1949, ‘moved toward a 
more flexible view of federalism that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and 
encourages intergovernmental cooperation — an approach that can be described as the 
‘dominant tide’ of modern federalism’ (Reference re Securities Act (2011) 3 SCR 837 57). It 
must at the same time be noted that the Court does not see cooperative federalism as the 
building block of the Canadian federal system. It does not force the different levels of 
government to act in a cooperative manner. According to the Court, it is up to the two 
levels of government to exercise their powers in ‘the spirit of cooperative federalism’. The 
Court simply suggests that a ‘cooperative approach’ might be useful ‘to ensure that each 
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level of government properly discharges its responsibility to the public in a coordinated 
fashion’ (Reference re Securities Act (2011) 3 SCR 837 9). In fact, the Court was sure to 
emphasise the distinctiveness of each level of government and the need to respect ‘the 
constitutional boundaries that underlie the division of powers’ (Reference re Securities Act 
(2011) 3 SCR 837 62). 
The operation of COF, unlike its Kenyan counterpart, is not based on constitution or 
any other law. Like its Spanish counterpart, however, the COF is not an ad hoc institution. 
As an institution of IGR that is based on an agreement signed by the premiers and the 
leaders of the three territories, however, it represents a departure from the era of the APC 
where the interaction, albeit regular, was informal. The agreement envisages that the 
Council meets at least twice a year (Art.9, COF Founding Agreement).VII The premier of 
the chair is selected on a rotational basis, with each chair only serving one year (Art.7, COF 
Founding Agreement).  
The COF receives bureaucratic support in a form of a steering committee and a 
secretariat. The steering Committee, which is composed of the deputy ministers in charge 
of intergovernmental relations or a representative designated by a premier of a province, 
assists the council by preparing ‘the meetings of the Council and carry[ing] out the study, 
research and analysis mandates that it receives from the Council’ (Art.14, COF Founding 
Agreement). It is responsible for giving direction and supervision of the Secretariat, which 
provides administrative support by way of making the necessary preparations for meetings 
of the Council (Art.16, COF Founding Agreement). This suggests that the work of the 
secretariat is administrative in nature, limited to facilitating the meetings. It does not ‘serve 
as an instrument of research analysis and prescription’ (Leclair 2006: 55).VIII The Secretariat, 
like its Kenyan counterpart, is funded by the provinces ‘on pro rata basis formula 
according to their respective populations’ (Art.17, COF Founding Agreement). 
There is a long ongoing debate on whether a legal framework, in a form of a 
constitution or ordinary law, is essential for the effective functioning of an 
intergovernmental forum. The indication from the case studies is that it does not. The 
Constitution of Canada, the federation with the most frequent and regular 
intergovernmental relations and structures, makes no mention of intergovernmental 
relations. There is also no empirical evidence to suggest that institutionalization matters or 
that legally regulated intergovernmental structure does a better and enduring job of 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
110 
facilitating collaboration among constituent governments. Of course, constituionalisation 
and institutionalization of intergovernmental relations might promote or ensure periodic 
intergovernmental interactions. The reverse is not, however, true. The absence of 
constituionalisation does not suggest weak intergovernmental relations. There is no 
evidence to suggest that intergovernmental forums that are not institutionalized 
unavoidably fall into a period of disuse. Intergovernmental relations that does not have 
constitutional recognition might be as effective as a constitutionally recognized 
intergovernmental relations, if not more.  
Perhaps the need for formal and institutionalized intergovernmental relations depends 
on a context, particularly on the culture of intergovernmental dialogue in a country. In a 
country where there has not been a long history and practice of intergovernmental 
dialogue, a law that mandates such interaction might be a good idea. With respect to Spain, 
for example, some argue that as a country ‘where a culture of political cooperation has yet 
to take root’, Spain should have considered constitutionalizing intergovernmental relations. 
According to them, ‘a constitutional framework that enshrines the principle of partnership 
and removes the obstacle for the collaboration among the different territorial powers 
would help to consolidate these new cooperation mechanisms’ (Galvez and Ruiz 2013: 
235). The same argument is advanced by Segui, who also emphasizes the need for a law 
that regulates intergovernmental relations in Spain. ‘Providing a framework for a joint 
cooperation in the autonomous State can serve to eliminate the shortcomings and 
deficiencies of the current regulatory system, considering the lack of culture of cooperation 
that exists in our state’ (Segui 244). Perhaps their fear is borne out by the fact that, at the 
end of the day, the relevance and effectiveness of CAG, depended on the wishes of some 
of the Autonomous Communities and literally died when those Autonomous Communities 
lost interest and stopped taking the initiative.  
In short, what is important is that there is a shared feeling among constituent 
governments about the value of dialogue and cooperation. Institutionalization and 
formalization of intergovernmental relations may not bring about the desired result in the 









In line with the long tradition of its predecessor, the APC, decisions at the COF are 
made by consensus rather than by majority vote (Article 10, COF Founding Agreement). 
The CAG, on the other hand, follows a slightly different rule. The level of support required 
for making a decision depends on the nature of the decision (Glávez and Ruiz 2013: 233). 
If the decision is to merely make a political statement in a form of a declarations, unanimity 
is not a requirement. It suffices if the statement is endorsed by at least 15 Autonomous 
Communities. That would make the statement an official position of the forum. Unanimity 
is required when the decision involves the conclusion of agreements and protocols. This 
does not mean that an agreement may lapse if it does not secure the support of all 
Autonomous Communities. Members of the forum that sponsor or support the agreement 
are required to engage with the members that are refusing to support the agreement, struck 
a compromise and pass the agreement at the next meeting. If that does not happen, the 
agreement may be adopted by a majority vote provided that the dissenting autonomous 
communities do not object to the conclusion of the agreement. The agreement will not 
have an effect on Autonomous Communities that are not party to the agreement. The 
constitutive document of the CCG is silent on decision-making process. 
The requirement of unanimity for decision making suggests that constituent units in 
Canada and Spain are unwilling to forfeit their sovereignty for the sake of horizontal 
collaboration. But this should not be surprising. Given the zealousness with which 
subnational units tend to protect their autonomy, it is not realistic to expect a decision-
making process that is not based on consensus. At best, as it is the case in Spain, it might 
be possible for a horizontal intergovernmental forum to pass a declaration without binding 
effect based on majority votes. It is, however, unlikely for a subnational government to 
abide by decisions of others on matters that it has exclusive jurisdiction. What Collins 
(2015, 14) said with respect to Canadian provinces would apply to subnational 
governments in other federations: ‘On their own, provincial governments often have 
neither the interest nor the power to force each other to take certain actions to implement 
particular solutions’.  
Even in situation where decision has been secured, none of the horizontal forums have 
put in place a clear mechanism to ensure that those decisions are implemented. The 
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subnational governments are not, for example, required to introduce mirror legislation for 
the purpose of implementing agreements adopted by a horizontal forum (Leclair 2006, 55). 
One of the main challenges of the CCG is the failure of implementation of resolutions it 
has adopted, which is largely attributed to the lack of enforcement mechanisms for 
decisions (Intergovernmental Relations Technical Committee, 2018). The conclusion of an 
agreement by the CAG does not entail a legal obligation on the Autonomous Communities 
that have expressed their support (Segui 244). It merely encourages them to take the 
administrative or legal actions that are necessary to implement the agreement. Failure to do 
so does not represent a violation of the agreement. This shows that the agreements are a 
little more than political statements. When the COF adopted the recommendation of its 
Health Care Innovation Working Group (HCIWG), the report released by the premiers 
simply stated that ‘provinces and territories intend to implement the measures and 
recommendations outlined in the report as they deem appropriate to their health care 
system’ (Council of Federation, 2012, 6). The discretionary tone of the statement suggests 
the absence of a strict obligation to implement agreements reached by member of the 
COF. This is not surprising given that ‘[p]rovinces do not seem eager to establish binding 
mechanisms that could ensure the implementation of their agreements over interprovincial 
matters’ (Leclair 2006, 55). 
 
5. Purposes of  horizontal intergovernmental forums 
 
As the name itself suggests, horizontal intergovernmental forums are often deemed to 
be motivated by the need and desire to coordinate interactions between and among 
subnational governments. Horizontal collaboration seems to be the goal. This could be 
about exchange of information and best practices. It could also be about formulating and 
implementing joint projects or ensuring that citizens have access to minimum level of 
services when they move from one subnational unit to another (Colino 2009).IX Linked to 
this is the desire to remove internal trade barriers and harmonize standards, avoiding 
situations where citizens are burdened by laws and regulations that do not recognize the 
licenses or permits they obtained or the educational qualification they received from other 
parts of the country. The same applies to companies that work across subnational 
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boundaries. Horizontal intergovernmental forums that can facilitate the harmonization of 
standards or the removal of barriers play a crucial role in the creation of one economic 
community. 
However, horizontal collaboration may not be the only and, in some cases, even the 
primary focus of horizontal intergovernmental forums. Horizontal forums are also used to 
develop common position against the federal government. This could be about subnational 
governments using the forum as a means to increase their bargaining powers with federal 
government. It may also be about protecting jurisdictional autonomy from interventions of 
the federal government. Effective cooperation between constituent governments might 
take away from the national government the argument that it needs to intervene on a 
certain area on the ground that it affects all constituent units. In such cases, a forum might 
be horizontal in its organization but vertical in its orientation. 
The purpose of the COF was one of the issues that was flagged by some of the 
provincial governments when the Premier of Quebec, Jean Charest, proposed its 
establishment (Noél 2003). The other provinces were happy to support the idea on the 
condition that the council does not become a forum to fight the federal government. The 
premier of Ontario blatantly indicated that the council should not be used as a forum to 
gang up on the federal government. For him and many others, it should be a forum for 
promoting provincial collaboration on matters of mutual interest. It was probably a 
commitment from the Premier of Quebec that the forum will not be used to bash the 
federal government that encouraged the provinces and the three territories to bring the 
COF into a reality. 
A look at the objectives of the council indicates that horizontal collaborations forms an 
important part of the mandates of the COF (Art.3 & 4, COF Founding Agreement). The 
COF seeks to strengthen ‘interprovincial-territorial cooperation’ by, among other things, 
serving ‘as a forum where members can share and exchange viewpoints, information, 
knowledge and experience’. It is also mandated to ‘address any issue of priority, which, in 
the opinion of the members, requires the pooling of expertise, a greater dialogue between 
them or the co-ordination of their actions’. Yet, horizontal collaborations are not the only 
focus of the COF. The Council is expected to ‘exercis[e] leadership on national issues of 
importance to provinces and territories and in improving federal-provincial-territorial 
relations’. This has two objectives. On the one hand, the aim is to use the Council as forum 
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to present a unified front in the face of the federal government. It is expected to achieve 
this by ‘provid[ing] integrated and coordinated approach to federal-provincial-territorial 
relations through the development of shared common analysis and positions’. On the other 
hand, it aims at protecting the autonomy of the provinces against the actions and laws of 
the federal government. The constitutive document of the Council states that the COF’s 
mandate is to ‘analyze actions or measures of the federal government that in the opinion of 
the members have a major impact on provinces and territories’. 
Similarly, in Spain, the CAG seeks to serve dual purposes. The institution is expected 
to facilitate both vertical and horizontal interaction (Gálvez and Ruiz 2013: 233). On the 
one hand, it aims to facilitate dialogue and promote collaboration between the 
Autonomous Communities within the scope of their competences. It does so, first, by 
serving as a ‘forum for dialogue among the autonomous regions’ and, second, by allowing 
for ‘voluntary political and administrative cooperation in the field of regional powers’. But 
it also targets the relationship between the national government and the autonomous 
Communities. It strives to promote ‘collaboration between the Autonomous-Community 
Governments and the Government of Spain’. The dual role assumed by the forum was also 
reflected in the ‘institutional statement’ it adopted in its first meeting in 2011 when it 
stressed both the autonomy of the Autonomous Communities and the importance of 
collaboration with national government. 
On the other hand, a quick look at the stated functions of the CCG reveals that it is 
expected to promote collaboration on inter-county matters. From the nine functions listed 
for the Council, none of them speak to the idea of using the council as a forum to forge a 
common front against the national government or protect the autonomy of the counties 
from intrusive laws and actions of the national government (IGR Act). The COG is, 
among other things, expected to facilitate consultation amongst county governments, 
sharing of information and promotion of best practices. Dispute resolution, capacity 
building of governors, receiving reports and monitoring the implementation of inter-
county agreements on inter-county projects, considering matters refereed to the council by 
a member of the public and consideration of reports from other inter-governmental 
forums on matters affecting national and county interest or relating to performance of 
counties are some of other the functions of the Council. Perhaps the only reference that, 
albeit indirectly, allows the counties to the use the forum as means to gang up against 
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national government is that the Council is expected to serve as a forum for ‘considering 
matters of common interest to county governments’. These, however, could mean both 
national and inter-county issues. 
A quick survey of the practice of the three intergovernmental structures indicates that 
the three horizontal intergovernmental structures have done, to a varying degree, a good 
job of facilitating horizontal collaboration. The COF, for example, has done a very good 
job with respect to internal trade. Following in the footsteps of the APC that is largely 
responsible for the harmonization of interprovincial trade, the COF, albeit after initial 
failures that forced provinces to create bilateral agreements, managed to produce the 
Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) (Collins 2017: 6), an intergovernmental 
agreement that aims at removing barriers and facilitating internal trade. The Premiers also 
deservingly boast the success that the COF and its HCIWG achieved by creating the pan-
Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA) through which the Premiers managed to put 
together their resources and purchased prescription drugs in bulk, which reportedly saved 
governments’ 712 million dollars (Health Care Innovation Working Group, 2016)). In 
2010, the COF also adopted a water charter, ‘which sets out principles for inter-
jurisdictional coordination on water conservation’ (Collins 2017: 7). The forum has also 
served as a forum to share information (Collins 2017: 10).  
In the case of Spain, the CAG, following in the footsteps of its predecessor, continued 
to facilitate horizontal collaboration. In fact, in the first meeting, the members adopted a 
number of agreements and protocols, among other things, on ‘fisheries, industry, research 
and transport’. They have also signed a convention declaring ‘the mutual recognition of 
licenses for hunting and recreational freshwater fishing’ (Seguí, 244). Prior to that, 
individuals were required to obtain a license from each AC where they want to engage in 
hunting and fishing. Another convention ‘for the coordination of networks of domestic 
violence shelters for women’ was also signed in the first meeting. 
Yet, despite their stated original aim, horizontal collaboration is not given priority by 
the three horizontal structures. They are more preoccupied with national issues rather than 
with inter-subnational matters. Creating a common front against the national government 
has been the primary task of the three horizontal structures. In the case of Canada, for 
example, one of the early successes of the COF involved the creation of common front 
against the national government on negotiation around health care.X The negotiation 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
116 
resulted in the adoption of the 2004 health accord, ‘a set of 10-year intergovernmental 
health-funding agreements’, which ‘increased federal health transfers by 6 percent a year’. 
‘For many years’, Morrison (2013) argues, ‘the Council of the Federation largely provided a 
forum for the provinces and territories to bash the federal government and ask for more 
money’. This is also a sentiment shared by Leclair (2006: 55), according to whom, ‘[t]he 
main purpose of the council has rather been to build common fronts against what the 
provinces considered unconstitutional incursions by the central government in their own 
affairs’XI  
The same is true in Kenya. Despite its constitutive document that is disproportionately 
oriented towards horizontal collaboration, the practice of the CCG shows a forum that is 
used to wage a battle against national government and national institutions. Sometimes 
these battles were about challenging actions of national government and national politician 
that seem to interfere with the autonomy of county governments. In other cases, it is about 
securing more authority and resources from the national government. The battle was 
intense during the early days of the Council when Isaac Ruto was the first Chairman of the 
CCG. At one point, the chairman declared that the national government is waging an 
onslaught on devolution. He argued that ‘MPs seem determined to claw back on 
devolution’ and referred to ‘23 pieces of legislation which do not recognize devolution and 
this, [he said], we must stop’ (Daily Nation, 4 August, 2014).XII At one point in time, the 
Council was mulling over the possibility of drafting a comprehensive Bill that aims at 
‘saving’ devolution and ‘into which we will enter everything to stop any maneuvers against 
devolution’ (Ibid). In addition to attempting to enact an all-inclusive legislation that 
protects the system of devolution, the Council has also gone to court a number of times 
challenging the actions of national government.XIII As Kangu (2019: 36) noted, the relations 
of the CCG ‘with the national government have been more adversarial than cooperative’. 
Creating a common front is not always possible. In Canada, for example, the premiers, 
in 2016, attempted to renegotiate the intergovernmental health-funding agreement. After 
initially rejecting the proposal of the federal government unanimously, the premiers did not 
stay long before each of them, with the exception of Manitoba, signed individual 
agreements with the federal government (Collins 5). Similarly, the provinces were 
successful in using the COF to jointly oppose a federal government plan to reaffirm ‘its 
role in the labor market training’ but they were less successful in preventing the federal 
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government from introducing changes ‘to the temporary foreign workers program’ (Collins 
2017: 5-6). The experience is similar in Spain and Kenya. There is a limit to what a united 
subnational front can do in terms of pressuring the federal government to accept their 
wishes.  
Some scholars seem to suggest that the limitation of a horizontal forum in advancing a 
vertical aim is inherent in the nature and design of horizontal intergovernmental forums. A 
national government, goes the argument, can hardly be expected to be bound by a decision 
of a forum of which it is not a member. In the case of the COF, for example, the 
provincial government can only recommend ‘a solution to the federal government’ (Leclair 
2006: 55). This might be a valid point but only so if we see a horizontal forum as direct 
means of communicating with national government. That is, however, rarely the case. A 
horizontal forum does not promote a ‘vertical agenda’ by adopting a decision that binds the 
federal government. It is rather used as a forum for developing a common position to 
negotiations with the federal government. At best, it is a forum for lobbying. This means 
that, of course, the effectiveness of a horizontal forum presupposes the availability of an 
active vertical intergovernmental forum through which subnational governments can 
negotiate with the federal government and the existence of a link between the horizontal 
and vertical forum. The link could be formal, established in the form of submission of 
reports and decisions of the meetings of the horizontal forum as well as the inclusion of 
those decisions in the agenda of the vertical forum. It could also be informal, established 
by the nearly identical composition of the two forums.  
Of the three horizontal forums discussed in this article, the CCG has a formal link with 
other intergovernmental structures. It is expected to submit an annual report to the 
summit, the apex vertical intergovernmental structure that brings together county leaders 
and the national government. XIV The Spanish horizontal forum, the CAG, had also links 
with the national government as it is required to inform the national government about the 
outcomes of its meetings, including a report on agreements concluded in every conference. 
The CAG may, from time to time, invite the President of the national government to 
attend its meetings. Similarly, in Canada, the COF ‘may decide, from time to time, to hold 
special meetings to which it may invite the Federal Government’XV but it does not have 
formal links with the vertical intergovernmental structures. It, for example, does not have a 
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link with the First Ministers Conference (later renamed the First Ministers’ Meetings) that 
brings together the premiers and the federal prime minister.  
As mentioned earlier, the link does not have to be formal. In the case of Canada, for 
example, the absence of a formal link has not totally shielded the vertical forum from the 
influence of positions taken and decisions made at the COF. It was only after the united 
position of the Premiers on the future of a health care, initially developed through the 
horizontal forum of the COF, was put at the First Ministers’ Meetings that the 2004 Health 
Care Accord came into reality (Hueglin and Fenna 2015). What is crucial is the continued 
existence of a functioning vertical intergovernmental forum. The impact of the the COF as 
a horizontal forum that allows for the development of common front was, for example, 
limited during the Harper government that was not enthusiastic about the vertical forum 
and preferred to engage in bilateral terms with the provinces (Collins 2015). Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper had also declined repeated requests to attend meetings of the COF 
(Hueglin and Fenna 2015: 257). That perhaps explains the failure to renegotiate the 2004 
Canada Health Accord that, as a result, expired in early 2014 (Hueglin and Fenna 2015: 
257).  
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Kenyan and Spanish horizontal forums have 
better links with their vertical counterparts. This is not always seen favorably. In Kenya, for 
example, some question the wisdom of requiring the CCG to submit a report to the 
summit (Mitullah 2012). They argue that the Summit is not required by law to discuss the 
reports of the Council and more importantly, it is not clear why a body composed of 
county governors has to submit a report to another body that is almost similar in 
composition. The only difference between the Summit and the COG, they argue, is that 
the latter does not include the President of the Country as its member.  
This criticism of the reporting structure misses the important role of the horizontal 
structure as the forum to create a common united front against the national government. 
The link through reporting allows the counties to communicate the national government 
their common position on matters of political and constitutional importance. The link 
would in particular be effective if the mechanism requires the Summit to consider the 
report and take actions, if required. The consideration of the reports gives the counties a 
direct opportunity to pressure or convince the national government on the issue 
considered. One cannot, therefore, dismiss the value of linking the horizontal and vertical 
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forum through reporting. Furthermore, the fact that the Kenyan horizontal forum is linked 
with national and county parliaments through reports adds transparency to the activities of 
the forum. The only problem is that the nature of the duty of reporting imposed on the 
forum ‘could lead to a situation where the county assemblies receive the reports after the 
Summit, the Senate and the National Assembly’ (Mitullah 2012: 3). One would expect that 
the link with county assemblies would be given more priority and attention given that the 
COG is a council of counties.  
The absence or presence of a link with vertical intergovernmental structure is not the 
only factor that determines the success of a horizontal forum as a structure for creating and 
sustaining a common front. Finance also matters. The financial muscle of national 
governments, in particular, makes it difficult to sustain a common front against the federal 
government. In the case of Canada, for example, its fiscal leverage allows the federal 
government to easily undermine provincial solidarity. ‘Small and poor provinces are 
particularly vulnerable to the federal “divide and conquer” strategy’ (Leclair 2006: 55). The 
1999 Social Union Framework Agreement, signed by the federal government and all the 
provinces, except Quebec, is a good example of Ottawa’s successes when it strategically 
resorts to its fiscal leverage to sway poorer provinces to toe the line.  
It is also often difficult for subnational governments to create or sustain a common 
front against the federal government when the subject matter involves matters on which 
the provinces have disparate interests (Collins 2017: 7). This is the case, for example, in 
Canada with respect to issues related to energy where a more pronounced and at times 
public divide between the interest of the oil rich Alberta and other provinces that have 
expressed their interest in energy strategy that takes climate change into account has made 
an agreement impossible. This shows that horizontal collaboration is difficult to achieve 
when the interest of the provinces is disparate.XVI This is facilitated by the fact that the 




The quick survey of three horizontal intergovernmental interactions has revealed that 
such interactions rarely have a clear constitutional basis. With the exception of Kenya, the 
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constitutions of the other two federations do not sanction cooperation as an imperative 
mode of intergovernmental reaction. As a result, there is no constitutional provision or law 
that provides for the establishment of horizontal intergovernmental structures, for that 
matter any intergovernmental structure. That, however, does not seem to matter. The 
federation with the most frequent and regular interactions is Canada, whose constitution or 
laws do not regulate intergovernmental relations. This discounts the argument that attaches 
constituionalisation of intergovernmental relations with robust and effective 
intergovernmental cooperation. The constitutional origin of institutions of IGR is 
uncommon 
The experience of the three federations also reveals that institutionalization of 
intergovernmental relations may be useful but it is not a necessary condition for effective 
intergovernmental relations. The horizontal intergovernmental structures discussed here 
vary from the highly institutionalized CCG in Kenya to the moderately institutionalized 
COF and loosely institutionalized CAG. The relevance of institutionalization depends on 
context. In a country like Kenya where there has not been any history of multilevel 
governance, let alone history of intergovernmental interactions, institutionalization might 
have given it the kick start it needs. It probably has allowed the country to develop the 
habit of engaging in intergovernmental dialogue. The same might be true for Spain where 
there has not been a ‘culture of cooperation and dialogue’. What is equally clear, however, 
is that effective intergovernmental relation may take place even in the absence of a 
formalized and institutionalized intergovernmental structure.  
Finally, horizontal intergovernmental structures may not be functioning in manner that 
their name suggests. Despite the expectation that they will focus on facilitating horizontal 
collaboration, they are invariably focused on matters that involve the national government. 
They may be horizontal in their structure but vertical in their orientation. They are used as 
forums to create a common front against the national government or a forum to protect 
the autonomy of the units from what they regard as intrusive actions of the federal 
government. 
                                                 
* Professor, Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence, University of the Western Cape, South Africa 
I The establishment of such a forum was first proposed by Premier Daniel Johnson of Quebec in 1994. That 
did not materialize due to the electoral success of Parti Quebecois that was not really interested in strengthening 
the federal system. The idea was resuscitated when the Quebec Liberal Party came to power in 2003. 
II The 2001 Pelletier Report, as it was known, named after the Intergovernmental Relations Minister Benoit 
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Pelletier, who drew the report, included not only the membership of the federal government but also a voting 
system that included vetoes. The report even envisaged the possibility of providing the forum a quasi-
constitutional status. The Quebec government at the time (the Charest government) was not confident that 
the other Premiers would endorse the establishment of an intergovernmental forum that has a quasi-
constitutional status (Collins 2015). The Premiers were also in agreement in the decision to exclude the 
federal government from the forum, preferring to make it a purely horizontal institution of IGR (Collins 
2015). 
III The Constitution of Spain acknowledges the possibility of cooperation agreements between Autonomous 
Communities although such agreement is subject to authorization by the Cortes Generales, the national 
parliament (Article 145, Spanish Constitution). It is reported that the number of cooperation agreements 
between Autonomous Communities has seen a steady rise since 2006. But despite the numerous horizonal 
agreements concluded between Autonomous Communities, institutionalized horizontal intergovernmental 
relations was non-existent in Spain. Many of the horizonal agreements did not also involve many 
Autonomous Communities but were usually concluded between Autonomous Communities that happen to 
share borders and, as a result, found it necessary to cooperate in order to solve common problems. (Morales, 
96). 
IV It is reported that there were about only 20 cooperation agreements signed between Autonomous 
Communities between 1978 and 2005. This number doubled within a period of five years after 2005, with 
more than 40 agreements being signed between 2006 and 2011, with the significant increase in the number of 
agreements attributed to the Meetings Between Autonomous Communities (Morales 99). 
V It prohibits the federation of Autonomous Communities. This was not seen as a big problem as the 
Autonomous Communities were initially focused on consolidating their autonomy and gave little or no 
attention to the need for intergovernmental relations.  
VI It was Lord Atkin in 1937 that famously described the division of powers between the federal and 
provincial legislatures as ‘watertight compartments’ (Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 
[1937] A.C. 326, at p. 354).  
VII Its predecessor, the APC, used to meet only once a year. The COF has not only increased the frequency of 
meeting to two but has actually met twice every year except in 2010, 2011 and 2014. In fact, there were years 
when it met five times (twice), four times and three times (three times). 
VIII The agenda of the meeting of the CCG is determined by the chairperson and vice chairperson of the 
Council. This includes  the date, time and venue of the meeting. This, however, has to be done in 
consultation with the secretariat. In the case of the COF, the founding agreement is silent on agenda setting.  
IX In the case of Spain, for example, Colino (2009, 1) notes that ‘[c]omplaints about the need of 17 different 
authorizations and standards for citizens or companies operating around the country, the reported cases of 
difficulties in getting free health care for travelling citizens in other regions, and other cases of lacking 
coordination have newly brought to public attention some dysfunctionality in areas of exclusive regional 
jurisdiction’. 
X The same is true with the first meeting of the Premiers in 1887. Despite the fact that it was declared that the 
purpose of the conference is to promote collaboration on provincial matters, the first conference ended after 
proposing ‘17 constitutional amendments’ that, among other things, targeted national government and its 
institutions. … The five-point plan of action it adopted immediately after the establishment of the Council 
reveal as much. 
XI Collins (2015) disagrees with this view and hold that the business of the COF is not disproportionately 
focused on federal-provincial matters. 
XII ‘He listed posting of county commissioners, prohibiting governors from flying flags, creating a summit for 
deputy governors, and attempts to take over some of their functions such as health and early childhood 
education as examples of the war against devolution’ (Daily Nation 2014). 
XIII This was the case, for example, when they challenged the 2014 County Government Act that established 
County Development Boards The Boards, chaired by Senators, are empowered to control initiation and 
approval of development projects in counties. The County governors, who are supposed to serve as 
secretaries of the boards, opposed the act on the ground that it is anti-devolution as it interferes with the 
autonomy of county governments. It was the CCG that went to court and secured a ruling that declared the 
Act ‘null and void as it gave senators, MPs and the executive unlawful powers to interfere with county 
governments’ (Daily Nation 2014). 
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XIV The CCG is also linked with parliaments of both national and county parliaments. It is required to submit 
annual report to both house of the national parliament. In addition, the same report must be forwarded to 
the county assemblies ‘within three months after the end of every financial year’. 
XV It has, however, placed under it at least two sectoral horizontal intergovernmental councils: The Premiers’ 
Council on Canadian Health Awareness and the Secretariat for Information and Co-operation. 
XVI This also explains why it has been impossible for the COF to facilitate agreement among the provinces 
and the territories on matters of climate change. The interests of the oil and natural gas rich provinces and 
the other provinces has made it impossible for the COF to broker a common provincial/territorial position 
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